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WHEN "FAIR IS FOUL": A NARROW READING OF THE
FAIR USE DOCTRINE IN HARPER & ROW,
PUBLISHERS, INC. v. NATION ENTERPRISES
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,I the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of permissible fair use2 of copy-
righted works. The Court held that a magazine in a news commen-
tary announcing a forthcoming book about a public figure's career
may not quote verbatim from the copyrighted factual book. The
Court concluded that The Nation's verbatim quotation of 300 words
in its news article was not a fair use because The Nation is a commer-
cial medium and the book was not yet published.3 By relying on two
categorical presumptions in its fair use analysis, presumptions
against fair use of unpublished works and fair use in commercial
publications, the Court imposed rigid criteria on a doctrine Con-
gress intended to be a sensitive balancing of interests. Furthermore,
the Court slighted Congress's idea-expression dichotomy 4 by failing
to grant a wider scope of fair use to factual works. In so doing, the
Court upset the balance between copyright law, which protects au-
thors' interests, and the first amendment, which protects the dissem-
ination of information so that the public may be informed through a
"free trade in ideas." 5 By enlarging the copyright owner's monop-
oly over expression, the Court has granted a concomitant monopoly
in the ideas and information that are inextricably entwined with pro-
tected expression.
This Note argues that by introducing categorical presumptions
into the fair use analysis, the Court unwisely altered the efficacy of
the fair use doctrine as a means of accommodating the often com-
peting interests of copyright and the first amendment. Further, the
Court's decision may chill news reporting and otherwise restrict the
dissemination of information. Finally, this Note proposes an alter-
native fair use analysis that ensures that courts give due deference to
the values underlying copyright law and the first amendment.
1 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
2 Fair use is defined as "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use
the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding
the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
AND LrrERARY PROPERTY § 125, at 260 (1944). The Supreme Court partially quoted this
definition in Harper & Row. 471 U.S. at 549.
3 Id. at 560-69.
4 See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
5 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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I
BACKGROUND
A. The Purposes of Copyright Law and the First Amendment
The copyright clause of the Constitution expressly authorizes
Congress to grant authors exclusive rights in their works for limited
periods. 6 Congress's primary purpose in enacting copyright legisla-
tion is to provide authors with incentives to create works that benefit
the public welfare by disseminating information and advancing
knowledge in the public domain.7 The authors' resulting economic
rewards are merely a secondary consideration. 8 Moreover, enforce-
ment of copyright legislation requires a sensitive balancing of inter-
ests between authors' interest in the control of their works and the
competing public interest in the dissemination of information.9 By
granting a temporary monopoly to authors, copyright law may con-
flict with the ultimate goal of copyright as well as fundamental first
amendment values,' 0 both of which aim to advance the public wel-
fare through the free flow of information and ideas. If protection of
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8 states, "The Congress shall have Power . .. To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]"
7 See generally Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'v U.S.A. 560 (1982) (Congress and courts have devised doctrines to limit copyright
holder's monopoly over his work, including idea-expression dichotomy and fair use doc-
trine). The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954): "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
... copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
... ." Construing the purpose of copyright legislation, the Court has stated that "[t]he
sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright]
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
8 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)
("[R]eward to the owner [is] a secondary consideration ... [that] serves to induce re-
lease to the public of the products of his creative genius." (citing Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932))).
9 In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984),
the Court stated that the copyright laws involve "a difficult balance between the interests
of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information,
and commerce on the other hand."
10 The tension existing between the means used by copyright and its ends are re-
flected in the statement of the House Committee on Patents:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two ques-
tions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so
benefit the public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be
detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under
the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that
outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT S7 (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds. 1976).
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the copyright owner's interest were overly broad, copyright law
would impose too heavy a burden on the public by chilling the dis-
semination of information and relegating ideas of public concern to
private ownership. 1
The first amendment grants speakers and the press freedom to
express divergent views, and favors free dissemination of speech,
particularly on matters of political and public concern.' 2 In recent
first amendment cases, the Supreme Court has categorized various
types of speech into a hierarchy of levels of protection. Obscenity
and fighting words receive no protection from the first amendment,
while commercial speech receives less protection than political
speech. 13 The Court has held that political speech lies at the core of
first amendment values and therefore receives the highest degree of
protection.14 Political speech facilitates "a self-governing body poli-
tic, whose freedom of individual expression should be cultivated...
for the positive purpose of bringing every citizen into active and in-
telligent sharing in the government of his country."' 15 The Court
has ruled that political speech may not be curtailed absent "a clear
and present danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent."' 6 Thus, the first amendment,
as an amendment to the Constitution, limits the power of Congress,
under the copyright clause, to grant authors a monopoly that en-
11 See generally Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright. I, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503
(1945) (although purpose of copyright law is to protect scientific and artistic works,
scope of protection should depend on property's nature and on appropriate benefits
and burdens caused by private ownership).
12 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion) (to encourage robust debate on public issues, constitutional protection must be
extended to discussion and communication involving matters of public and general con-
cern); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("The constitutional right of free
expression ... is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the
arena of public discussion ... in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately pro-
duce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity .... ); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (profound national commitment to principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open).
13 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(first amendment protection required for speech of political content, but no protection
required for fighting words, obscenity, libel, and less protection required for profanity
and commercial speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (whether speech is protected by first amendment depends on content
of that speech).
14 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15 Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 260-61.
16 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech-
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy... except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action.").
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croaches upon fundamental first amendment values. 17
The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act)18 attempts
to accommodate the competing interests of copyright law and the
first amendment by granting authors exclusive rights to control
their work subject to a series of exceptions. Section 106 of the 1976
Act provides that copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right "to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies," "to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work," and "to distribute copies
... of the copyrighted work to the public."'19 Sections 107 through
118 list several exceptions to these exclusive rights. For example,
the fair use doctrine, set forth in section 107, allows others to copy
portions of the work under certain circumstances without permis-
sion from or payment to the copyright owner during the copyright
holder's monopoly. 20 Congress and the courts have also sought to
limit the scope of the copyright monopoly through the idea-expres-
sion dichotomy, which protects an author's rights in expression but
not ideas.2' Such limits on the copyright owner's monopoly have
been expanded or contracted, depending on whether the legislature
17 See Nimmer, Does Cpyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1182 (1970).
18 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1978) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). To achieve the difficult balance of accommodat-
ing the competing interests of copyright law and the first amendment, as well as to adapt
to technological change, Congress has amended the Copyright Act numerous times.
The first Congress passed the initial copyright statute. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1
Stat. 124 (1845). Congress has completely revised the Act four times: Act of Feb. 3,
1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1846); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 85-111, 16 Stat. 198,
212-16 (1871); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (formerly codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976)); and the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 (present act).
19 Section 106 provides in full:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the follow-
ing:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
20 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Other exceptions include § 108(a), which allows librar-
ies and archives to make no more than one copy of the phonorecord or work, and
§ 110(1)-(2), which permits public performances for purposes such as teaching and edu-
cational broadcasting.
21 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D] (1985); see infra notes 23-28.
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and the judiciary have favored either protection as an incentive for
authors or free dissemination of ideas for the public benefit.2 2
Under the balance struck by the 1976 Act, copyright owners possess
a limited, temporary monopoly over their works.
1. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The idea-expression dichotomy, set forth in section 102(b) of
the 1976 Act,23 establishes that copyright protects literary form and
choice of words but does not protect ideas or facts. The rationale
for this dichotomy rests in the belief that ideas are the common
property of all and must remain common property for a self-gov-
erning people to make informed decisions.2 4 This doctrine further
recognizes that authors build on the works of their predecessors. As
one commentator noted, "A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a
giant can see farther than the giant himself." 25 Justice Brandeis me-
morialized this legal norm when he said, "The general rule of law is,
that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascer-
tained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communi-
cation to others, free as the air to common use." 26 The Supreme
Court has embraced the notion that authors cannot copyright facts
and ideas, stating that "[u]nlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclu-
sive right to the act disclosed; protection is given only to the expres-
sion of the idea-not the idea itself."27 Courts have applied this
principle to factual works, such as those concerning history and bi-
ography, and traditionally have held that historical facts are in the
public domain and hence unprotected by copyright.28
22 See Gorman, supra note 7, at 560.
23 Section 102(b) states:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). This section reflects Congress's explicit intent to limit the
scope of protection to the expression of ideas rather than the ideas themselves. The
Register of Copyrights has stated, "Copyright does not preclude others from using the
ideas or information revealed by the author's work .... [A]nyone is free to create his
own expression of the same concepts, or to make practical use of them, as long as he
does not copy the author's form of expression." REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REvISION 3 (Comm. Print 1961).
24 See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 1189-92.
25 Chafee, supra note 11, at 511.
26 International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
27 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
28 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d
Cir. 1966) (although first author's mode of expression is protected, he cannot acquire
monopoly by copyright in narration of historical facts), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967);
Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940,.942-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (facts copied from biogra-
phy of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg are not copyrightable); Norman v. Columbia Broad-
[TVol. 72:218
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2. The Doctrine of Fair Use
The fair use doctrine allows subsequent authors to use limited
amounts of expression from copyrighted works to serve the public
interest. Fair use is "a privilege in others than the owner of a copy-
right to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner with-
out his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner by the copyright." 29 There are limits to such use-the subse-
quent user cannot appropriate material so extensively as to cause
substantial injury to the copyright owner.30 The doctrine of fair use
evolved as a judicially-created exception to the copyright laws. 3'
Congress codified the doctrine for the first time in section 107 of the
1976 Act.3 2
Although some courts have viewed the doctrine as a legal fic-
tion of implied consent by the copyright owner, most recognize that
such consent is irrelevant in light of the important social policy con-
siderations 33 and unambiguous statutory language in the 1976
casting Sys., 333 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (no copyright in facts about life of Ezra
Pound).
29 H. BALL, supra note 2, § 125, at 260.
30 Id. at 261. The Supreme Court recently explained the mechanics of the fair use
doctrine in limiting the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners. "[T]he definition
of exclusive rights in § 106 of the present Act is prefaced by the words 'subject to sec-
tions 107 through 118.' Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted mate-
rial that 'are not infringements of copyright' 'notwithstanding the provisions of section
106.'" Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 (1984).
Thus, fair use of a copyrighted work does not constitute copyright infringement.
31 See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05, at 13-62; Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of
Copyright, 6 COPYRIGrr L. Symp. (ASCAP) 43, 48-49 (1955) (tracing case history of "fair
use" and its development into legal doctrine).
32 Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). This codification "endorse[d] the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use," H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 [hereinaf-
ter HousE REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5680, but
did not attempt to "freeze the doctrine in the statute." Id.
33 The policies supporting the fair use exception include the recognition that the
public has an interest in the dissemination of ideas and information and that authors
build upon the works of their predecessors. See Cohen, supra note 31, at 43, 49. Similar
policies support the idea-expression dichotomy limit on copyright. See supra notes 23-28
and accompanying text.
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Act.34 The most clearly recognized examples of fair use-the right
to quote from a copyrighted work for the purposes of news report-
ing, criticism, comment, illustration, or reference in preparation of a
subsequent work-benefit the public by disseminating information
and advancing knowledge.3 5 Thus, the fair use doctrine serves as a
safety valve to resolve possible conflicts between copyright and the
first amendment.3 6
Section 107 of the 1976 Act directs courts to consider four fac-
tors for determining whether a given use is "fair": the purpose of
the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and sub-
stantiality of the language used, and the effect of the use on the mar-
ket for the original.37 Section 107's language and legislative history
reveal that Congress intended that the four factors serve as illustra-
tions of the major considerations in fair use analysis. Congress did
not ascribe weights to any of these factors, and no single factor is
meant to control.38 Furthermore, the enumerated factors do not ex-
haust the types of interests courts can weigh in the fair use
calculus.3 9 Rather, Congress directed courts to consider section
107's four factors along with any other relevant considerations in
balancing the interests of the copyright holder, the user, and the
public. 40
a. The Purpose of the Use. Under the "purpose and character of
the use" factor, courts examine the purpose for which the expres-
sion is excerpted from the author's work. The preamble to section
107 expressly endorses several purposes: "criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research." 4 1 These
enumerated purposes are not exclusive but merely illustrative.42
34 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
35 Cohen, supra note 31, at 51-53.
36 See Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of
Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 299 (1979) (fair use doctrine's avoidance of potential
conflicts between property rights and first amendment interests makes elevating doc-
trine to constitutional status unnecessary); see also Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington,
Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 560-61 (D.D.C. 1981) (clash between first amendment and copy-
right is adjusted through doctrine of fair use).
37 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
38 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5680; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT], reprinted in W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 499 app. at
500 (1985); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448,
454-55, 455 n.40 (1984) (discussing "equitable rule of reason" as requiring case-by-case
analysis with no one factor wholly determinative); id. at 476 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting House and Senate reports).
39 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5678-80; 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05[A], at 13-65 n.15.
40 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05[A], at 13-66.
41 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
42 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05[A][1], at 13-67 n.21.
[Vol. 72:218224
HARPER & ROW. WHEN "FAIR IS FOUL"
Furthermore, because the doctrine requires balancing competing
interests rather than applying rigid rules, even if a particular use
qualifies as one of the enumerated purposes, courts must balance
this factor against the other three factors. 43 For instance, under the
purpose factor, courts consider whether the use is commercial or
nonprofit.44 The Supreme Court ruled in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. 45 that the commercial nature of an activity
is "not conclusive," but rather a factor to be "weighed in any fair
use decision,"' 46 stating further that "every commercial use of copy-
righted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the mo-
nopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright." 47
Whether a use that is arguably commercial will be deemed a fair use
depends upon whether the use is "primarily for scholarly, historical
reasons" or "primarily for the public benefit" 48 rather than
predominantly for private commercial gain. In Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,49 for example, the Second Circuit explic-
itly sanctioned the fair use of factual material in popular and com-
mercial works where the works benefit the public by disseminating
information on matters of public concern. The court concluded
that, in such instances, the public interest in obtaining information
should prevail over possible damage to the copyright owner's
interest.50
b. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work. Section 107 also directs
courts to consider the nature of the copyrighted work from which
expression is taken. 51 Courts have declared that copyright protec-
tion is narrower (and the scope of fair use broader) for informa-
43 Id. at 13-69.
44 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982).
45 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
46 Id. at 448-49.
47 Id. at 451.
48 See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724
F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983) (advertising use was fair use where purpose of advertisement
was to report factual information), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he court may consider whether the alleged in-
fringing use was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial gain."); Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (ad-
vertisement was fair use because its purpose was to present truthful and comparative
advertising to public); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 217 (D.NJ. 1977) (index which was taken from but served different purpose than
original was fair use as it conveyed important information to public).
49 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
50 366 F.2d at 309. The court also stated that privacy rights are limited for public
figures and that "'at some point the public interest in obtaining information becomes
dominant over the individual's desire for privacy.'" Id. (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
51 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982).
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tional and factual works than for entertainment and artistic works. 52
Courts have made this distinction because some ideas can be ex-
pressed in only a limited number of ways, 53 and because of the
strong public interest in the free flow of information.54 The Sony
Court noted that "[c]opying a news broadcast may have a stronger
claim to fair use than copying a motion picture." 55 Similarly, the
Second Circuit held in Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. that for
factual works, copyright protection "is narrow indeed, embracing
no more than the author's original expression," and "absent whole-
sale usurpation of another's expression, claims of copyright in-
fringement... are rarely successful." 56 Thus, for factual works, a
subsequent author may have to provide a verbatim reproduction or
very close paraphrase of the entire work before a court will deem
the use an infringement. 57
Courts also consider whether a copyrighted work is published.
The scope of fair use is narrower for unpublished works that are
deemed confidential by their owners. 58 However, where an author's
decision to remain unpublished is not motivated by a desire for pri-
vacy or confidentiality, at least one court has held that fair use is
permitted. 59
c. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Courts con-
sider "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole.''60 This factor requires that
courts evaluate the expression used both quantitatively and qualita-
tively. The amount refers to the number of words used and the sub-
stantiality refers to the qualitative value of the expression.6 1 Section
52 Compare Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1981) (reproduc-
tion of scientific scales in popular magazine to entertain readers held unfair use) with
Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(television news broadcast containing portion of plaintiff's song held fair use).
53 See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
54 See, e.g., Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984)
("[I]nformational... works may be more freely published ...."); Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Since
the risk of restraining the free flow of information is more significant with informational
works, the scope of permissible fair use is greater."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
55 Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
56 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). The court justified
its holding by citing the fundamental policy underlying the copyright laws: "encourag-
ing contributions to recorded knowledge." 618 F.2d at 980.
57 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 2.11[A]-[B].
58 3 id. § 13.05[A][2], at 13-73.
59 Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (if au-
thor does not seek confidentiality, fair use is not necessarily precluded as to unpublished
work).
60 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982).
61 See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724
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107 invites courts to calculate a ratio by comparing the amount of
expression used to the original work as a whole. 62 Originally, the
fair use doctrine permitted only the use of an insignificant portion
of material, but it now allows more significant copying of protected
material where copying is clearly in the public interest and serves
the underlying purpose of the Copyright Act.63
The crucial difficulty in applying the fair use doctrine is deter-
mining what is substantial similarity. 64 An insubstantial similarity
which has little or no impact on the original work is a fair use under
the principle of de minimus non curat lex (the law does not take notice
of very small or trifling matters). 65 Conversely, a verbatim copying
of most or all of the original is usually an infringement of copy-
right.66 Thus, while the ends of the spectrum are clear, the middle
ground is undefined. The court's decision of what constitutes sub-
stantial similarity is further complicated by interaction with the
other three factors in the fair use analysis. For example, a wider
scope of fair use, and hence a greater amount and substantiality of
expression, is permitted for informational works and works benefit-
ting the public. 67
d. The Effect of the Use on the Market for the Original. Finally, sec-
F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983) (copying verbatim 29 words of total work of 2,100 words held
fair use), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (copying magazine cover held fair use
although copying contents might not have been so).
62 Section 107(3) focuses on "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 17 U.S.C § 107(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
63 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir.) (because
fundamental purpose of copyright law is "the encouragement of contributions to re-
corded knowledge," copyright protection for historical works is narrower than for non-
factual works), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
64 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05, at 13-64.
65 See, e.g., Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.) (insig-
nificant paraphrasings from plaintiff's scholarly works in magazine article held fair use),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(insubstantial copying held fair use).
66 See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (excessive
copying precludes fair use even if other factors point to contrary result), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979); Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1977) (verbatim copying of major portions of copyrighted research report sold to
subscribing businesses held unfair use), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Quinto v.
Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981) (reprinting approxi-
mately 92%7 of plaintiff's story precludes fair use defense). But see Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (verbatim copying of entire copy-
righted works permitted where copying done for private use and no evidence of damage
to original's market presented).
67 See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.) (scope of
copyright protection for historical accounts is narrow), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980);
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (reproduction of
photographs of Kennedy assassination deemed fair use because of public interest in dis-
semination of news).
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
tion 107 of the 1976 Act requires that courts determine whether the
use of the expression has a detrimental effect on the value of, or
market for, the original work. 68 In most cases, this factor determines
the outcome. 69 Courts evaluate whether the second work replaces
demand for the original, thus decreasing the value of the copyright
owner's interest. 70 Furthermore, courts consider not only actual
damages incurred by the copyright owner, but rather "whether un-
restricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the de-
fendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market for or value of the plaintiff's present work."' 71 In
Sony, the Supreme Court explained that "[w]hat is necessary is a
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful
likelihood of future harm exists."' 72 Where the two works are in dif-
ferent media or serve different functions, the likelihood decreases
that the second work will encroach on the original's market, and
thus fair use is usually permitted. 73 One commentator has noted
that where both works consist of factual matters the defendant may
more readily invoke the fair use defense even if both works serve
similar functions, provided the copying has not been extensive.74
Furthermore, the Second Circuit in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson 75 explained
that the fourth factor requires courts to strike a balance
between the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted
and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is
denied. The less adverse effect that an alleged infringing use has
on the copyright owner's expectation of gain, the less public bene-
fit need be shown to justify the use.76
B. Application of the Fair Use Doctrine and the Idea-
Expression Dichotomy to Factual W~rks
The tension between the copyright monopoly and the dissemi-
nation of information is particularly striking when a factual work is
68 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
69 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05[A][4], at 13-76; see, e.g., Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); DowJones
& Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); H.C. Wainwright & Co. v.
Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Wainwright
Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1014 (1978).
70 Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
822 (1964).
71 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05[A][4], at 13-77 (footnote omitted).
72 Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
73 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05[B], at 13-79.
74 Id. at 13-79 n.40.
75 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
76 Id. at 183 (citations omitted).
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the subject of a fair use controversy. 77 The public has a strong in-
terest in obtaining information about important discoveries, histori-
cal events, and the like,78 and subsequent authors may need to
appropriate parts of a work to relate facts that can be expressed in
only so many ways. 79 Courts have therefore allowed a greater scope
of fair use for factual works than for artistic and literary works.80
For example, because courts have held that the facts contained in
historical biographies of such public figures as Ezra Pound,8 ' the
Rosenbergs,8 2 and Howard Hughes8 3 are not copyrightable, courts
have permitted extensive use of expression from such factual works
by subsequent authors. Courts explain that one cannot obtain a
copyright for facts,8 4 news,85 and historical interpretations8 6 and
that the use of expression from such works is a fair use. Thus, both
before and since the enactment of the 1976 Act, courts have recog-
nized a wide scope of fair use for informational works whose dissem-
ination benefits the public.
II
HARPER & Row, PUBLISHERS, INC. V. NATION ENTERPRISES
Harper & Row acquired the copyright to former President
Ford's memoirs in February 1977. The agreement with Ford gave
Harper & Row exclusive rights to publish Ford's then-unwritten
77 Gorman, supra note 7, at 561.
78 Id.
79 Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
80 See Gorman, supra note 7, at 561; supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
81 See Norman v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 333 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
82 See Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
83 See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
84 In Rosemont, the court recognized that because the idea-expression dichotomy
renders ideas noncopyrightable, copyright does not protect facts and information in
copyrighted articles. 366 F.2d at 306.
85 In International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918), the
Supreme Court held that news stories are not protected by copyright because
the news element-the information respecting current events contained
in the literary production-is not the creation of the writer, but is a report
of matters that ordinarily are publiijuris; it is the history of the day. It is
not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution... intended to
confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a historic
event the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.
86 In Hoehling v. University City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 841 (1980), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's summaryjudgment
for the defendants on the issue of infringement. The defendants' fictional account had
used ideas and some expression from plaintiff's historical interpretation of the
Hindenberg's last voyage. 618 F.2d at 979-80.
In addition, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) provides that ideas and discoveries are not
copyrightable. See supra note 23.
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memoirs.8 7 The agreement imposed a duty upon Ford to preserve
the book's value by withholding from the public any information not
already disclosed about his career."" Shortly before publishing the
memoirs, Harper & Row contracted to sell Time the first-serialization
rights to print a chapter of the book.8 9
In March 1979, an undisclosed source gave a manuscript of
Ford's unpublished memoirs to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation,
a weekly news and political commentary magazine. 90 Navasky knew
that Harper & Row owned the copyright and planned to soon pub-
lish the memoirs, 9' but claimed ignorance of any other contractual
agreements involving the book.92 He consulted with legal counsel,
who advised him that he could publish an article about the forth-
coming book under the fair use provision of the Copyright Act.93
Believing the memoirs contained important information about the
Nixon pardon, Navasky wrote a news article about the forthcoming
book and published it in The Nation.94
The article, which is approximately 2,500 words long and
quotes approximately 300 words from the memoirs, 95 appeared on
87 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir.
1983).
88 The agreement demonstrated the value of the information in the book, as infor-
mation rather than expression, to Harper & Row. It stated:
Author acknowledges that the value of the rights granted to Publisher
hereunder would be substantially diminished by Author's public discus-
sion of the unique information not previously disclosed about Author's
career and personal life which will be included in the Work, and Author
agrees that Author will endeavor not to disseminate any such information
in any media, including television, radio and newspaper and magazine
interviews prior to the first publication of the Work hereunder.
Agreement between President Gerald R. Ford and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. and
The Reader's Digest Association, Inc. § 20(b) (Feb. 28, 1977), reprinted in 2 Joint Appen-
dix to Petition for Certiorari at 484, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632).
This agreement influenced Ford's decision not to appear on an NBC television special
exploring the pardon of former President Nixon. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 198.
89 Time agreed to pay $25,000 for the first-serialization rights. It agreed to pay
$12,500 on signing the contract and reserved the right to renegotiate the second pay-
ment if material from the book was disseminated before Time printed its excerpts.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542-43.
90 Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 198. At trial undisputed testimony established that
Navasky neither solicited nor paid for the book. Id.
91 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
92 Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 198.
93 Id.
94 Id. At the time, Ford was considered a serious contender for the 1980 Republi-
can presidential nomination. Mashek, Where They're Already Running for President, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1979, at 57-58.
95 The article is reproduced in its entirety in the appendix to the Supreme Court's
opinion. 471 U.S. at 570 app. The Court footnoted the portions of the article that
quote Ford's memoirs. Id.
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newsstands on April 3, 1979.96 The article announced the expected
publication dates of the book and Time's excerpts, summarized in-
formation about Ford's decision to pardon Nixon, Ford's dealings
with Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, and several other prominent
public figures, and mentioned Ford's decision to run for a full term
as president. 97 The same day, Time requested permission from
Harper & Row to publish its serialization a week earlier than
planned. Harper & Row denied the request and Time cancelled its
serialization agreement. Time did not print any excerpts and refused
to pay the balance outstanding from the agreement. 98
A. The District Court Decision
Harper & Row brought a copyright infringement suit against
The Nation's publishers in federal court in the Southern District of
New York. The district court held that The Nation had infringed
Harper & Row's copyright because its use of paraphrased material
and 300 words of verbatim quotations was not a fair use.99 Applying
the fair use factors, the court held that (1) the purpose of the article
was commercial profit, (2) the nature of the original work was soon-
to-be published, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used was "the heart of the book," and (4) the market effect caused
Time to cancel its serialization agreement, thus diminishing the
copyrighted work's value. 00 Although the court noted that histori-
cal facts and interpretations are not copyrightable, it reasoned that
"these facts and memoranda collected together with Ford's reflec-
tions" formed a copyrightable totality.' 01 The court denigrated the
article's alleged news reporting purpose, claiming that this was not
"such news, 'hot' or otherwise, as to permit use of ... Ford's copy-
righted material."' 0 2
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that only 300 words of
The Nation article were copyrightable and that The Nation's use of this
limited amount of expression constituted a fair use.'0 3 The court
96 Harper &Row, 723 F.2d at 198. By this date Navasky had learned of Time's plans
to publish excerpts in its April 23 issue, but did not know which portions of the book
Time planned to excerpt. Id.
97 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 570 app.
98 Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 199. Harper & Row claimed that its carefully planned
marketing program for the book would be harmed by Time's earlier serialization.




103 Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 208.
1986]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
first examined the portion of the article that was not verbatim quota-
tions and concluded that historical facts, interpretations, memo-
randa written by other persons, conversations attributed to and
originating in other persons, and information contained in govern-
ment documents were not copyrightable. 10 4 The court rejected the
district court's "totality" theory, noting that joining copyrightable
expression with uncopyrightable facts does not transform the whole
work into a protected totality. The court reasoned that such a total-
ity theory would impermissibly expand copyrightable matter, al-
lowing any public official "to take private possession of the most
important details of a nation's historical and political life by adding
language." 105 Examining the 300 words of verbatim quotations
under the statutory fair use factors, the court held that (1) the pur-
pose of The Nation article was news reporting, (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work was factual and thus the scope of permissible fair
use was broad, (3) the amount and substantiality used were quan-
titatively "meager" and qualitatively reasonably necessary for the
purposes of a news article, and (4) although the article caused Time's
cancellation, the use's market effect on the copyrighted work was
questionable because the publication of facts rather than the limited
use of expression had caused the breach.' 0 6 The court noted that
the article communicated important public matters and used a lim-
ited amount of expression to achieve that end, stating that "the
copyright holder's monopoly must not be permitted to prevail over
a journalist's communication. To decide otherwise would be to ig-
nore those values of free expression which have traditionally been
accommodated by the statute's 'fair use' provisions."'10 7 A dissent
argued that The Nation's use of both the facts and verbatim quota-
tions was not a fair use because The Nation sought to profit from the
use and the article caused "substantial incursion into the market for
the primary work."' 0 8
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the Second Cir-
cuit. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, concluded that The
104 Id. at 203, 205.
105 Id. at 205.
106 Id. at 207-08. The court reasoned that The Nation's motive-profit-was, by it-
self, legally irrelevant if the work offered some public benefit. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 216 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Judge Meskill endorsed the district court's
totality theory, arguing that facts can be copyrighted to protect an original author's ar-
ticulation, presentation, method of treatment, and selection of details. He maintained
that because the article contained no independent research, it was not original and thus
did not qualify as news. Rather, the article appropriated more of the memoirs than was
necessary. Id. at 212-16.
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Nation's use of 300 words of verbatim quotations was not a fair use.
Although the Court briefly noted that the law is currently unsettled
regarding the copyright protection to be accorded to factual works,
it chose not to reach this issue.10 9 The Court instead focused solely
on whether the 300 words of verbatim quotations used in the article
constituted a fair use.110 Employing the fair use factors, the Court
found that although the article's general purpose was news report-
ing, the publication's commercial nature negated a finding of fair
use. The Court quoted Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. for the proposition that "every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively... unfair.""' Examining the nature of
the copyrighted work, the Court found that its factual nature sup-
ported a finding of fair use; however, its unpublished status was also
"a critical element of its 'nature' " which weighed against such a
finding.1 2 Regarding the amount and substantiality of the portion
used, the majority noted that although the words were quantitatively
insubstantial, qualitatively, The Nation had used 'the heart of the
book.' "113 The Court compared the amount of material quoted to
the total number of words in the article, concluding that "the fact
that a substantial portion [thirteen percent] of the infringing work
was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value of the cop-
ied material." 114 Finally, in evaluating the article's impact on the
original's market, the Court ruled that the article precipitated both
Time's cancellation of the serialization agreement and consequent
refusal to pay the balance owed. Further, the Court stated that "a
fair use doctrine that permits extensive prepublication quotations
from an unreleased manuscript without the copyright owner's con-
sent poses substantial potential for damage to the marketability of
first serialization rights in general.""15
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dis-
sented. He argued that the majority had overly protected the copy-
right owner's economic interests by adopting an "exceedingly
narrow definition of the scope of fair use" which threatened to "sti-
fle the broad dissemination of ideas and information copyright is
intended to nurture."' 1 6 The dissent deemed The Nation's quotation
of 300 words a fair use, reasoning that the use's purpose was news
109 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548.
110 Id. at 549.
111 Id. at 562 (quoting Sony Corp. of. Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984)).
112 Id. at 563-64. The majority noted that the common law of copyright provided a
narrow scope of fair use for unpublished works. Id. at 550-51.
113 Id. at 564-65 (quoting Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072).
114 Id. at 565.
115 Id. at 569.
116 Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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reporting, a purpose explicitly endorsed as a fair use by Congress in
section 107 of the 1976 Act. 117 For the dissent, the copyrighted
work's factual nature demanded a broader scope of fair use than
that provided nonfactual works. 11 8 The amount of the words copied
was quantitatively small. Qualitatively, the words taken were ex-
pressive and poignant, but were neither "excessive [nior inappro-
priate" given the article's purpose. 119 Finally, the article's market
effect was questionable-the significant facts in the article, rather
than the verbatim quotations, caused Time to cancel the agreement.
The dissent concluded that the majority's "exceedingly narrow ap-




Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises addressed the
issue of whether and to what extent the Copyright Act's fair use pro-
vision sanctions a magazine's use of quotations from a public fig-
ure's unpublished manuscript depicting a matter of public concern.
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the fair
use doctrine by presuming that any use of expression by a commer-
cial publisher and any use of expression from an unpublished work
are unfair.121 By creating rigid presumptions in a doctrine Congress
intended to be a sensitive balancing of interests, the Court restricted
the utility of the fair use doctrine as a way to accommodate the
sometimes competing aims of copyright and the first amendment.
The Court's restrictive interpretation also undermines copyright
law's ultimate goal: to disseminate information. The decision may
chill reporting of news on matters of public concern in situations
where limited quotation of copyrighted expression is necessary to
convey ideas. Rather than employing presumptions in its fair use
analysis, the Court should have employed an interest-balancing ap-
117 Id. at 591.
118 Id. at 588-90. The dissent noted that
[w]ith respect to a work of history, particularly the memoirs of a pub-
lic official, the statutorily-prescribed analysis cannot properly be con-
ducted without constant attention to copyright's crucial distinction
between protected literary form and unprotected information or ideas.
The question must always be: was the subsequent author's use of literary
form a fair use within the meaning of § 107?
Id. at 588.
119 Id.at 601.
120 Id. at 605. The dissent further warned that the majority's holding "effect[s] an
important extension of property rights and a corresponding curtailment [of] the free use
of knowledge and of ideas." Id. (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 263 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
121 See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
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proach, weighing the copyright owner's interest in controlling his
writings against the public's interest in dissemination of
information.
A. The Majority's Misapplication of the Fair Use Factors
In its zeal to protect authors' first-publication royalties, the
Court gave insufficient weight to first amendment concerns. Simi-
larly, the Court slighted the congressional scheme of fair use and
the idea-expression dichotomy's limit on the copyright owner's mo-
nopoly. The Court protected property interests at the expense of
core first amendment values. It effectively granted copyright own-
ers a monopoly on information in cases where the information is
inextricably interwoven with expression, or more accurately, where
the information is the form of expression itself. In Harper & Row,
former President Ford's words and his interpretation of historic
events were the news event. The Court should have construed the
fair use doctrine liberally where a public official wrote on matters of
public concern.
1. The Purpose of the Use
Although the Court acknowledged that the use's purpose was
news reporting, a congressionally sanctioned use, the Court argued
that the publication's commercial nature was "a separate factor that
tend[ed] to weigh against a finding of fair use."' 122 The Court
deemed The Nation's use commercial because it "had not merely the
incidental effect but the intended purpose of supplanting the copyright
holder's commercially valuable right of first publication."' 123 The
Court concluded that because The Nation's use was commercial, it
was presumptively unfair.' 24 Thus, the Court invoked a rigid pre-
sumption against fair use by commercial enterprises to supersede
the news reporting aspect of the fair use analysis.
This presumption conflicts with the aims, policies, and explicit
language of the fair use doctrine as set forth in section 107. This
section lists news reporting as an example of an approved purpose
for fair use.' 25 Because Congress listed news reporting as an exam-
pie'and also stated that courts should give the use's commercial na-
ture some weight in the analysis, Congress must not have intended
that courts consider news reporting a commercial purpose. The ma-
jority claimed that the crux of the fair use issue is "whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material with-
122 Harper &Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 For the text of § 107, see supra note 32.
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out paying the customary price." 126 But this can be said of any fair
use. That one may use copyrighted material without making the
customary payment to the copyright owner is the central concept of
fair use, because fair use is an approved exception to the copyright
holder's monopoly. Under the Court's presumption, no commercial
publisher could ever use copyrighted material without permission.
An alternative interpretation of the statute, one which is more con-
sistent with congressional intent, is that Congress listed news re-
porting as an example of fair use because it viewed dissemination of
information as presumptively of public benefit.' 27
Furthermore, the Court's reliance on Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 128 for the proposition that any commercial
use is presumptively unfair is misplaced. 129 In Sony, the Supreme
Court held that the public's use of Betamax Video Tape Recorders
for purposes of timeshifting and taping of copyrighted television
programs was a fair use because it was not a commercial activity, it
served the public interest by making broadcasting more available,
and it was not shown to harm the copyright holder's monopoly. i30
Similarly, The Nation article was not created merely for commercial
gain. The article increased public exposure to Ford's memoirs and
disseminated important information. Harper & Row presents a
stronger case for fair use than Sony because The Nation article used
expression from an informational work on a matter of public con-
cern, while Sony concerned the copying of entertainment works. Un-
like the Betamax product, The Nation article's primary purpose was
to provide the public with political news and information.
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The Harper & Row Court noted that Ford's work was factual in
nature and that the law generally recognizes a broad scope of fair
use for such works. The Court concluded, however, that the work's
unpublished status was "a critical element of its 'nature,' " one
which outweighed the factors favoring fair use.' 3 1 Noting that "the
unpublished nature of a work is '[a] key, though not necessarily de-
126 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
127 See Brief for Respondents at 31, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-
1632). Interestingly, Harper & Row did not appeal the court of appeals' rejection of the
commercial publication argument. Id.
128 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
129 The Harper & Row Court quoted Sony for the proposition that "every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation." 471 U.S. at 562
(quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
130 464 U.S. at 454-55.
131 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
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terminative, factor' tending to negate a defense of fair use," 132 the
Court nevertheless concluded that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances,
the author's right to control the first public appearance of his undis-
seminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use." 133 The ma-
jority thus created a rigid presumption against the fair use of
unpublished works.
This presumption is flawed in several respects. First, the right
of first publication, like all other exclusive rights in section 106, is
expressly made subject to section 107.134 Congress chose not to
distinguish between published and unpublished works in creating
the fair use exception.' 3 5 Second, federal copyright law preempts
the common law rule denying fair use of unpublished works.' 36 In
Harper & Row, the Court relied on common law doctrine to support
its belief that copyright protects " 'undisseminated works until the
author or his successor discloses them.' ,1 The common law, how-
ever, restricted the fair use doctrine in the case of unpublished
works to protect the copyright holder's privacy interests, 138 not to
protect commercial interests. But no privacy interest existed in the
instant case, because Ford consented to the public dissemination of
his manuscript. Thus, the soon-to-be published status of the manu-
script indicated de facto publication of the work and should have
"tip[ped] the balance of equities in favor of prepublication use."' 139
The Court's presumption against prepublication fair use serves
to protect the author's "property interest in exploitation of prepub-
lication rights."'140 This overarching concern for property rights
clashes with Congress's intent to prevent copyright from squelching
the dissemination of ideas. The Court's presumption could bar any
use of expression before the author chooses to sell it, and thus sub-
132 Id. at 554 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 64, reprinted in W. PATRY,
supra note 38, at 501).
133 Id. at 555.
134 For the text of § 106, see supra note 19.
135 In other sections of the 1976 Act, Congress did distinguish between published
and unpublished works. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 108 (1982).
136 See I M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 4.01[A].
Prior to 1976, federal copyright protection started at the time of publication. In the
1976 Copyright Act, Congress extended statutory copyright protection to the time of a
work's creation. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 5745.
137 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553 (quoting REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 23,
at 41).
138 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05[A][2], at 13-73 (under the common law,
"the scope of the fair use doctrine is considerably narrower with respect to unpublished
works which are held confidential by their copyright owners" (emphasis added)).
139 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551.
140 Id. at 555. The majority stated that the commercial value of the right of first
publication lies in its exclusivity. Id. at 553.
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stantially affects the public's ability to receive information. 14 1 Fur-
thermore, this presumption effectively voids the statutorily
mandated exceptions to authors' exclusive rights from the time of a
work's creation until publication. 42 In a dramatic overstatement,
the Court asserted that any fair use of prepublished material would
"effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the
work of a public figure" and would eliminate "incentive to create...
such memoirs."' 143 Contrary to the Court's fears, the fair use doc-
trine would still protect informational works by public figures.
There is no need to narrow the fair use calculus by bright-line rules
and rigid presumptions.
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The majority conceded that the 300 words quoted verbatim
were an insubstantial amount. However, it then compared this
amount to the total number of words in the article, rather than to
the number of words in Ford's memoirs, and concluded that the
quotations comprised a substantial part of the article-thirteen per-
cent. But the Court compared these 300 words of quotations to the
wrong piece. Had it not adopted this reverse proportionality the-
ory, the Court would have been forced to concede that the article
used an insubstantial amount of the original work.
The Court's conclusion, that the excerpts qualitatively were not
a fair use because of their expressive value, was misguided. The
Court relied on the district court's holding that The Nation had taken
" 'the heart of the book.' ",144 The district court, however, erred in
its analysis by treating the copyright "totality" as ideas and informa-
tion coupled with expression. 145 Although the Court rejected the
district court's "totality" theory, 146 it affirmed the flawed conclusion
reached by the lower court.
4. The Effect of the Use on the Market for the Original
Failure to consider the idea-expression dichotomy skewed the
Court's analysis of the use's impact on the market for the original
work. The serialization agreement between Harper & Row and Time
reveals that the information in the memoirs, rather than the expression,
141 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 127, at 43.
142 In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress extended federal statutory copyright pro-
tection to works from the time of their creation, rather than, as previously, from the time
of publication. See supra note 136.
143 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557.
144 Id. at 565 (quoting Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072).
145 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 101 & 113 and accompanying text.
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was the valuable commodity. 147 As the dissent stated, "If it was this
publication of information, and not the publication of the few quo-
tations, that caused Time to abrogate its serialization agreement,
then whatever the negative effect on the serialization market, that
effect was the product of wholly legitimate activity." 148  The
Supreme Court justified its conclusion on the theory that "an in-
fringer who commingles infringing and noninfringing elements
'must abide the consequences.' 149 The Court reached an errone-
ous conclusion by collapsing a two-step inquiry into one. The infor-
mation disclosed was a noninfringing use because copyright law
does not protect ideas or information, and the expression used, if
appropriately analyzed apart from the information, was a nonin-
fringing use because of the reasonable amount taken and the pur-
pose of the use.
B. First Amendment Implications
The information in The Nation article provided news concerning
one of the most significant political events in recent decades: the
pardon of a former president who had resigned from office, nar-
rated by an eyewitness observer of privileged matters of state. The
article disclosed information not yet revealed to the public. Fur-
thermore, the article appeared when its subject matter had great sig-
nificance for the democratic process: Ford was considered a prime
contender for the Republican presidential nomination,1 50 and
Ford's interpretation of the events of his presidency could have af-
fected voters' decisions in the upcoming primaries. The subject
matter of the article rendered it political speech, and thus within the
core of protected first amendment values. 15' As such, the Court
should have given the speech the highest first amendment
protection. 152
When copyright law conflicts with the dissemination of political
speech, courts should use the fair use doctrine to balance the com-
peting interests of copyright law and core first amendment values.
Otherwise, copyright becomes an exception to the first amendment.
A first amendment exception to copyright is unnecessary because
the fair use doctrine provides flexibility that furthers the dissemina-
tion of information.' 53 Thus, the fair use doctrine requires a flexi-
147 For terms of the agreement, see supra note 88.
148 Harper &Row, 471 U.S. at 602 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 567 (majority opinion) (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
309 U.S. 390, 406 (1940)).
150 See supra note 94.
151 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
153 See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 1182; see also Cohen, supra note 31, at 48-49 (dis-,
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ble balancing of interests in order to accommodate first amendment
values. Rigid categorical presumptions undermine this flexibility
and encroach upon the first amendment.
The Harper & Row Court should have deemed The Nation's lim-
ited use of verbatim expression a fair use. First, because of the
work's factual nature and the need to quote the speaker to ensure
accuracy, the Court should have broadly applied the fair use privi-
lege to the work of a public figure on a matter of public concern.
Second, first amendment values require that The Nation's use of a
limited amount of expression to disseminate political news be
deemed a fair use. Copyright protection should not be construed as
an absolute exception to the first amendment. Fair use provides the
safety valve that allows the accommodation of copyright's monopoly
with the first amendment's dissemination requirement, but only if
courts sensitively balance the interests in a manner free of categori-
cal presumptions.
When viewed in this context, the fair use inquiry resolves into
whether suppression of a particular expression will violate political
freedom. The Harper & Row problem must be analyzed with two
factors in mind: first, the public had a right to know the events and
perspectives reported, and second, the press had a duty to inform
the public about this political information and to use a limited
amount of verbatim expression to achieve that end. The Harper &
Row decision permits copyright law to protect information as well as
expression, particularly where ideas and expression are inextricably
entwined. This result may seriously impede dissemination of factual
works and news. Harper & Row effectively grants a monopoly over
the facts underlying history and news where the reporting of those
facts requires a limited use of others' expression. Most newspapers
and other media, as commercial enterprises, may in the future re-
fuse to report on forthcoming books concerning matters of public
concern for fear that using isolated quotations from unpublished
original works will constitute copyright infringement.
Such vital public concerns outweigh the burden on copyright
owners' first-serialization royalty rights. A rigid and narrow reading
of the copyright laws should not constrain the freedom of the press.
The Second Circuit correctly observed that the Copyright Act is not
intended "to impede that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a
democratic state"'154 or "to chill the activities of the press by forbid-
ding a circumscribed use of copyrighted words."' 155 To effectuate
cussing utility of fair use doctrine in furthering dissemination of information); Gorman,
supra note 7, at 561-63 (same).
154 Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 197.
155 Id. at 209.
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the aims of copyright and to accommodate first amendment princi-
ples, courts should employ a fair use doctrine unrestricted by cate-
gorical presumptions and should equitably balance the interests of
the copyright holder against those of the public.
C. Proposed Analysis
Courts should employ a two-step inquiry when deciding
whether a second author's use of expression is a fair use. First, they
should analyze the expression under section 107's prescribed fac-
tors, giving due regard to both the nature of the work from which
expression is taken and the purpose of the subsequent work. Sec-
ond, courts should balance the interests between copyright law and
the first amendment by weighing the burden imposed on the copy-
right owner by the use of expression against the burden imposed on
the public by the denial of fair use. They should strike this balance
to accommodate first amendment values and further the ultimate
aims of copyright law.
Although the Harper & Row majority applied the statutorily-pre-
scribed fair use factors, it did not expressly balance the competing
interests of the copyright owner in exploiting his writing against the
public interest in the dissemination of information. Other courts
thus remain free to utilize the interest-balancing approach in future
cases, distinguishing Harper & Row on this basis. Furthermore, sec-
tion 107 does not preclude such interest-balancing, because the
codification is not exhaustive but merely illustrative, leaving courts
free to enlarge and adapt the fair use doctrine on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Courts should consider whether the work serves the public in-
terest by disseminating valuable information. If the injury to the
copyright owner is speculative or de minimus, or if the public inter-
est in the information is substantial, the public interest should
prevail.
Pressing first amendment concerns may justify a use of copy-
righted material that mechanical statutory fair use review would pro-
hibit.156 Such a situation would occur where expression and ideas
are so inextricably mixed as to forbid dissection, and the public in-
terest in disseminating the information far outweighs the damage
incurred by the copyright owner. For example, in Time Inc. v. Ber-
nard Geis Associates, 157 the court held that the defendant's use in his
book of sketches of frames from films of the Kennedy assassination,
of which the plaintiff owned the copyright, represented a fair use
because of the "public interest in having the fullest information
156 See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 1197-99.
157 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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available." 158 The court stressed that the c6pyright to the films did
not give its owner an "oligopoly" on the facts of the assassina-
tion.159 One commentator stated that in Bernard Geis, "it was only
the expression, not the idea alone, that could adequately serve the
needs of an enlightened democratic dialogue." 160
Similarly, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 161
the Second Circuit prominently considered the public interest in de-
ciding that the defendant's use of material from copyrighted articles
in his biography on Howard Hughes was a fair use. After balancing
the copyright owner's interest in privacy against the public's interest
in obtaining information about the life and career of a public figure,
the court concluded that "in balancing the equities . . .the public
interest should prevail over the possible damage to the copyright
owner."1 62
Interest-balancing focuses fair use analysis by enabling courts
to consider expressly the competing interests. First, interest-balanc-
ing helps courts avoid wooden application of the fair use doctrine
burdened by categorical presumptions and gives appropriate weight
to countervailing first amendment values. Second, it enables courts
to effectuate the ultimate aim of copyright-advancing knowledge in
the public domain-rather than sacrificing this aim by granting an
overly broad monopoly to copyright owners. Finally, interest-bal-
ancing allows the fair use doctrine to serve its intended function as a
safety valve to accommodate both copyright and the first
amendment.
CONCLUSION
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the fair use doctrine by in-
voking categorical presumptions in the fair use analysis of copy-
righted material. First, the Court legitimized the presumption
against the fair use of expression by a commercial enterprise. Sec-
ond, it ruled that use of expression from an unpublished work does
not constitute fair use. In so doing, the Court carved out exceptions
to previously permissible uses. It also established fixed criteria in a
calculus Congress intended to be flexible and fact-sensitive. In re-
stricting the scope and flexibility of the fair use doctrine, the Court
curtailed the ability of fair use to accommodate the sometimes com-
peting aims of copyright and the first amendment. Instead, the
158 Id. at 146.
159 Id. at 143-44.
160 Nimmer, supra note 17, at 1198.
161 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
,162 366 F.2d at 309.
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Court should have recognized the unique nature of factual works by
granting a greater scope of fair use for such works. More specifically,
the Court should have balanced the burden imposed on the copy-
right owner in permitting the use against the burden imposed on
the public in prohibiting the use-determining whether first amend-
ment values require that courts deem the press's use of a limited
amount of quotation from a public figure's memoirs a fair use. In-
stead, the Court chose rigid presumptions over sensitive balancing
and injected mercenary values into the public's "marketplace of
ideas." In construing what should have been "fair" as "foul," the
Court sanctioned the ownership of speech by a public official on
matters of public concern.
Robin Feingold
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